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Abstract—The concept of Extension Headers, newly introduced
with IPv6, is elusive and enables new types of threats in the
Internet. Simply dropping all traffic containing any Extension
Header –a current practice by operators– seemingly is an
effective solution, but at the cost of possibly dropping legitimate
traffic as well. To determine whether threats indeed occur, and
evaluate the actual nature of the traffic, measurement solutions
need to be adapted. By implementing these specific parsing
capabilities in flow exporters and performing measurements on
two different production networks, we show it is feasible to
quantify the metrics directly related to these threats, and thus
allow for monitoring and detection. Analysing the traffic that is
hidden behind Extension Headers, we find mostly benign traffic
that directly affects end-user QoE: simply dropping all traffic
containing Extension Headers is thus a bad practice with more
consequences than operators might be aware of.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the current day Internet, we know that for every security
measure, there is a multitude of people–with malicious intents–
trying to break or evade these measures. This is not a new
phenomenon, and security officers try to configure their (flow)
monitoring systems in ways such that these attacks become
visible. With the increasing adoption and deployment of IPv6
in the Internet however, there are many new possibilities
for attackers in terms of misuse, allowing for e.g. Advanced
Persistence Threats (APTs) and Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks. Relying on security approaches from the IPv4 era is
not sufficient. In order to stay one step ahead of attackers,
security officers and operators should be aware which of the
new features in IPv6 are exploitable, and to what extent their
monitoring tools are able to detect traffic related to these types
of misuse.
One essential difference in IPv6 is the concept of Extension
Headers (EHs). Because of their position in the IPv6 header,
namely in between the IP header and the upper layer header
(e.g. TCP or UDP), network devices need to perform extra
steps when determining what kind of traffic is actually inside
a packet. Tailored solutions to traverse and parse these headers
are not always available, be it for financial, technical or other
reasons. Simply dropping all the packets containing EHs is an
applied approach [1], but means all legitimate traffic with EHs
is discarded as well.
Measurement solutions need to be, just like security so-
lutions and other network devices, adapted to support the
newly introduced aspects of the IPv6 protocol. Similar to
e.g. firewalls, a measurement tool needs to traverse and parse
possible EHs in order to report statistics on the actual upper
layer payload. In the case of flow-based measurements, one
will see the protocol number of the first EH in a packet, but
have no clue about the remaining contents of that packet.
With adapted measurement tools at hand, one can analyze
network traffic containing EHs and determine the actual –
possibly surprising– nature of traffic hidden behind these EHs,
and see what is really being forwarded over the network.
Focussing on EHs, several threats are described in the
literature and proven feasible in lab setups, which we make
visible in our measurements (§ III): evading Access Control
Lists (ACLs) by injecting an EH, e.g. sending SSH traffic
with Hop-by-Hop Options, a possible first step from an APT;
causing a DoS or again evading middle-boxes by sending long
chains of EHs; causing a DoS by sending artificially large EHs,
aiming for devices with limited memory for processing these
EHs.
In this paper, we ask ourselves how one can deter-
mine whether traffic containing EHs should be forwarded
or dropped. We show how flow-based measurements can be
adapted to include information on hidden traffic, i.e. traffic
behind one or more EHs.
Contributions: In this work, we qualify and quantify
the traffic characteristics that are hidden by EHs, based on
measurements in two different types of production networks,
namely CESNET, the Czech National Research and Edu-
cational Network (NREN), and UTNET, a campus network
including residences. We show that by enhancing flow ex-
porters, both legitimate –but overlooked– network traffic, and
possibly malicious traffic is made visible: up to 0.7% of
IPv6 flows contained hidden information behind one EH.
Furthermore, we show that longer chains and large headers
do occur, but are exceptional. Our analysis on fragmentation
characteristics provides insights on possible improvements for
network operators, some directly influencing the Quality of
Experience (QoE) of end-users, especially in the case of large
DNS responses.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Extension Headers in IPv6
Extension Headers are optional headers between the IPv6
header and the higher layer header. The function of some of
these headers have equivalents in IPv4, although in IPv4 the
information was stored in fields in the IP header itself. An
example of this is the Fragmentation header. No Extension
Header is mandatory, and thus an IPv6 packet without any Ex-
tension Header (Fig. 1a) is perfectly valid. Multiple Extension
Headers can be included by means of header chaining based
on the Next Header field, as shown in Fig. 1b: the IP header
points to the first Extension Header, which in turn points to
the next Extension Header. The final Extension Header points
to the actual higher layer header, in this case TCP. As the
number and order of Extension Headers cannot be known a
priori, devices processing packets need to perform checks on
every packet. These extra checks do not only come with a
performance penalty during operation, but also add complexity
in the design of these devices.
B. Functionality
When the IPv6 standard (RFC 2460 [2]) came to be, some
of the described Extension Headers either fulfilled a direct
requirement, while others were intended for (future) flexibility
of the protocol. Table I shows all headers defined in the RFC,
and the protocols marked ‘EH’ by IANA in [3].
TABLE I: Extension Headers defined in RFC 2460 and
IANA assignments
Decimal Protocol RFC IANA
0 Hop-by-Hop Options  
43 Routing  
44 Fragment  
50 Encapsulating Security Payload  
51 Authentication  
60 Destination Options  
135 Mobility Header 
139 Host Identity Protocol 
140 Shim6 
253 Experiments/testing purposes 
254 Experiments/testing purposes 
The Hop-by-Hop Options and Destination Options are head-
ers in forms of Type-Length-Value (TLV) fields. These headers
represent options that should be processed at every forwarding
hop or only at the destination, respectively. The highest order
three bits determine how a node should act if a packet with
a header unknown to that node is observed, and whether the
data of that header may be changed en-route. Other than the
form and the meaning of the three bits, there are no further
definitions in the standard for these Option headers.
The Routing header is used by the source node to specify
one or more intermediate nodes en-route to the final destina-
tion of the packet. RFC 2460 only describes one type of this
header, Type 0, which is deprecated now because of security
issues [4]. Other defined Types of this header are Type 1
(unused, originates from the DARPA project Nimrod) and
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(b) With one Extension Header: $EH is the protocol number of the
Extension Header between the IPv6 header and the upper layer
protocol. The Next Header field in the Extension Header describes
the protocol number of the upper layer protocol.
Fig. 1: IPv6 Header layouts [2]
Type 2, which is used in Mobile IPv6.1 The Fragmentation
Header replaces the function of the Identification, Flags and
Fragment Offset in the IPv4 header. Finally, the Authentication
Header and Encapsulating Payload Header fulfil the functions
of IPSEC’s AH and ESP, in similar fashion to how it is used
in IPv4.
As the standard has been around for roughly two decades,
deprecation of a certain feature or part does not mean it does
not occur in the Internet anymore. Different types of devices
with varying implementations form a heterogeneous reality
vastly different from the latest version of the standard. But
even in that latest version of the standard, multiple types of
misuse are possible.
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3775#section-6.4
C. Misuses and caveats
Due to their dynamic nature, correctly implementing EH
handling is challenging. Their presence, number and length(s)
will vary per packet. Not only network stacks and (hardware)
forwarding mechanisms are subject to this challenge: firewalls
and ACLs possibly require additional configuration to cover
situations where EHs are used.
An example of such middle-box evasion is presented in [5]:
configuring a firewall to “block ssh; accept all;”
requires the firewall to traverse the EH-chain and find out
the actual upper layer protocol. Only then can it determine
whether the transport protocol is TCP, destined for port 22,
and thus drop the packet.
Long header chains have implications [6] in scenarios
where e.g. stateless firewalls need information up to the upper
layer protocol: when the packet is fragmented, and due to the
long header chain the first fragment does not contain all that
needed information, the firewall can possibly not act on that
packet appropriately.
Similar to the long header chains, the length of the EHs
can trigger unexpected behavior. Furthermore, where limited
memory for EH-processing is expected in forwarding devices,
sending artificially large EHs can form a DoS attempt.
Aside of these ways of intentional misuse, there are several
caveats (or possibly surprises) when EHs come into play.
One of these is clearly related to the aforementioned threats:
by choosing to drop all packets with EHs, one might drop
a surprisingly large share of actually benign traffic. In case
of e.g. fragmentation (handled by an EH in IPv6) large,
fragmented answers from servers might never reach a client.
When performing (flow) measurements and aggregating on
the protocol number without traversing the EH-chain, not only
will the actual type of traffic be hidden: the characteristics
of the flows will be vastly different as well. For example,
when aggregating fragmented (EH 44) traffic, without using
the actual upper layer ports to group the packets on, multiple
distinct flows will be aggregated into a big, single flow record.
When detection algorithms are implemented on finding big
flows, this will result in false positives. At the same time,
looking for many small flows, e.g. in brute-force dictionary
attacks, fails as well.
Attempts at clarifying or even deprecating (parts of) stan-
dards might improve the situation in the future. However, old
implementations of network stacks and security appliances
will be active for years, including faulty, exploitable imple-
mentations.
D. Flow-based measurements / IPFIX
Flow-based measurements are based on aggregation: pack-
ets are grouped based on a certain set of fields (e.g. source and
destination IP addresses, transport layer source and destination
port, and protocol), and statistics like number of packets and
number of bytes are accounted. Packet payload is typically
lost. This aggregation allows for reasoning on a higher con-
ceptual level, as well as scalable solutions where processing a
large number of packets is not feasible.
The process of aggregation happens either on a networking
forwarding device, e.g. a router, or at a dedicated flow exporter
which processes a mirror of the network traffic (in forms
of packets). The router or the flow exporter then sends out
(exports) the generated flow records to a collector, where
analysis takes place. Multiple exporters can export to a single
collector, enabling for easy analysis of multiple vantage points.
Two well-known standards for these flow measurements are
NetFlow (originally by Cisco, often available on forwarding
devices) and the IETF’s standardization effort IPFIX. An
important feature in IPFIX is its extensibility, which allows
exporting of new so-called Information Elements (IEs), a
concept we leverage in this work: while the IANA assigned
list [7] of IEs is extensive, it does not cover all the metrics
we are interested in.
An essential aspect of flow-based measurements is how the
flow cache in the exporter is handled: when implementing new
IEs, one needs to decide whether packets should be grouped
on that IE, possibly creating more distinct flow records than
prior to introducing the new IE.
For a comprehensive overview of all parts and processes
in flow-based measurements refer to [8] by Rick Hofstede et
al., or see [9] by Brian Trammell and Elisa Boschi for an
IPFIX-specific introduction.
E. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no large-scale passive mea-
surements on IPv6 Extension Headers have been performed in
recent years. Active measurements efforts by Fernando Gont,
Jen Linkova et al. are documented in an IETF Informational
document [1], showing that not only fragmentation headers
but EHs in general are often dropped in transit networks.
The Internet-Draft [10] by Fernando Gont et al. focusses on
operational implications regarding EH handling.
In [11], Martin Elich et al. evaluate traffic encapsulated in
IPv6 tunneling mechanisms, also using IPFIX and implement-
ing custom Information Elements. A comprehensive overview
of threats introduced with IPv6 is given by Johanna Ullrich et
al. in [12].
III. MEASUREMENT SETUP
We performed passive measurements on multiple links, to
observe which and how Extension Headers are actually used
on the Internet. In two different production networks, one
or more links were measured using dedicated flow probes,
exporting IPFIX records containing our additional Informa-
tion Elements. Only IPv6 flows were considered, for a time
period of roughly a month. Details on these networks and the
exporting process are described in the following sections.
A. Networks / Vantage points
1) CESNET: The NREN of the Czech Republic. Dedicated
flow probes are deployed on 8 different links, metering un-
sampled, exporting to a single collecting machine. These are
the external links, so any traffic going in or out of CESNET
is measured by one of the 8 probes. No specific filtering is
active on the links. The collection period was December 1 -
December 28, 2016.
2) UTNET: The campus network of the University of
Twente. A dedicated flow probe is deployed monitoring the
uplink of the network, unsampled. This uplink connects office
buildings, lecture halls, as well as student residences. No
specific filtering is active on this uplink, and the collection
period spanned the same four weeks as at CESNET. While a
campus network is naturally different from a consumer access
network, the students and employees living on-campus use
this same network as if it were a commercial Internet Service
Provider (ISP).
B. Extraction of properties
We implemented a plugin for the dedicated flow probes to
traverse the EHs and extract the properties listed in Table II.
TABLE II: Overview of essential EH-related properties
Property Type Size in key
No. of EHs integer 8 bits 
Total size of EHs integer 16 bits
Order of EHs string 255 chars 
Upper layer protocol integer 8 bits 
Upper layer source port integer 16 bits 
Upper layer destination port integer 16 bits 
Upper layer ICMP Type & Code integer 16 bits 
NB: The IANA list in [7] contains Information Elements
that could be used, but to make a clear distinction of our
own implemented fields, we created new fields. Some of these
IANA-assigned fields have shortcomings, for example the IE
ipv6ExtensionHeaders (ElementId 64) lists all observed EHs
but does not tell anything about the order. The normal fields
for transport layer information could and should be reused,
were this implemented as a production feature.
In order to populate the newly defined Information Elements
in the IPFIX records, every packet passing through the me-
tering process is checked for certain fields. This happens in
addition to the already existing export behavior, i.e. the usual
Information Elements are still exported. To obtain information
about the EHs, the (possible chain of) Next Headers must be
followed, until a header is observed that is not defined as an
EH. While performing this traversal, the following actions are
performed:
1) Increase EH count (first entry in Table II)
2) Add size of EH in bytes to sum total (second entry)
3) Append EH protocol number to list (third entry)
Upon observing the first non-EH (thus a protocol number
not listed in Table I), all information about the EHs has been
obtained. The non-EH protocol number tells us what the actual
upper layer protocol is, and is exported as such. Based on that
protocol number, the payload can be parsed to extract transport
layer port numbers or ICMP type and code.
C. Adapting flow cache keys
The set of fields aggregated on in the flow exporter naturally
determines which fields are visible in the flow records leaving
the exporter. The flow cache, containing the statistics of flows,
uses this set of fields as a flow key mapping to the statistics
(i.e. packet and byte counters). Therefore, for every flow that
we want to distinguish, this set needs to be unique. In case
of the hidden traffic that we want to expose, new fields are
introduced that can and have to be used in the flow key, thus
the aggregation. For our newly introduced IEs, the last column
in Table II marks whether the property is indeed included in
the flow key. In case of TCP and UDP on the actual upper
layer, we add the protocol number, the source port and the
destination port to the flow key. Note that without traversing
and parsing the EH chain, these three fields are not available:
two fragmented flows between a pair of hosts would show
up as a single flow record, containing the sum of packets and
bytes of both flows. Similarly for ICMP, the type and code are
used in the flow key. Lastly, the number and order of EHs are
used in the flow key as well: if one of these things changes
‘within a flow’, we do not want it to go unnoticed, ergo export
separate records.
D. Ethical considerations
While our measurements require IP addresses to aggregate
packets to flows, we do not need the IP addresses themselves.
Thus, systematic and deterministic anonymization of the ad-
dresses in the export process on the different vantage points
does not interfere with our analysis, while preserving privacy
of users on these networks.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Share of traffic containing EHs
Firstly, we look at what share of traffic contains one or more
EHs. An overview of the results for both networks is given
in Table III. For CESNET, we found 0.7% of IPv6 flows to
contain one or two EHs. The share for UTNET is smaller, at
0.1%. Packet count and byte count wise, the shares are smaller
than for the number of flows on CESNET (0.2% and 0.3%,
respectively), while on UTNET these numbers are equivalent.
Note that in case of fragmented traffic, these flow counts are
derived after reassembly. As L4 port information lacks from
non-first fragments, our flow exporters export first-fragments
and non-first-fragments as separate flow records. Thus, the
numbers in the overview tables are corrected for that by
merging these separate flow records and counting them as a
single flow.
Overviews of all the observed protocols over IPv6, which
can be obtained without any additional intelligence on flow
exporters, are listed in Table IV. This table shows which
protocols the aforementioned 0.7% and 0.1% are comprised
of: focussing on EHs in that table, we find mainly Fragmen-
tation Headers and, in the case of CESNET, also Hop-by-Hop
Options.
B. Chains of multiple EHs
More details on the EH chains longer than 1 are provided
in Table V. The clear majority of flows, packets and bytes
are accounted for by ICMP6 containing Hop-by-Hop Options
TABLE III: Measurement overview: Observed numbers of EHs
Dataset No. of EHs Flows Packets Bytes Notes
CESNET
0 2.5G (99.3%) 86.8G (99.8%) 81.0Ti (99.7%) NREN/transitional network;
8 vantage points;
unsampled
1 17.0M (0.7%) 197.4M (0.2%) 214.4Gi (0.3%)
2 654 (0.0%) 72.1K (0.0%) 48.3Mi (0.0%)
UTNET
0 2.2G (99.9%) 158.5G (99.9%) 140.6Ti (99.9%) Campus network;
1 vantage point;
unsampled
1 2.0M (0.1%) 169.1M (0.1%) 148.6Gi (0.1%)
2 58 (0.0%) 5.4K (0.0%) 3.7Mi (0.0%)
TABLE IV: CESNET/UTNET: Flows/packets/bytes per protocol
CESNET UTNET
Protocol Flows Packets Bytes Protocol Flows Packets Bytes
UDP 1.1G (45.6%) 13.2G (15.2%) 9.2Ti (11.4%) TCP 1.5G (67.0%) 111.3G (70.2%) 101.5Ti (72.1%)
TCP 738.0M (29.7%) 70.5G (81.1%) 71.4Ti (87.9%) UDP 554.7M (25.4%) 46.7G (29.4%) 39.0Ti (27.7%)
ICMP6 591.4M (23.8%) 2.8G (3.2%) 279.9Gi (0.3%) ICMP6 163.7M (7.5%) 427.4M (0.3%) 36.2Gi (0.0%)
IPv6-Frag 10.1M (0.4%) 187.1M (0.2%) 213.7Gi (0.3%) IPv6-Frag 1.8M (0.1%) 4.7M (0.0%) 4.3Gi (0.0%)
HOPOPT 7.0M (0.3%) 10.4M (0.0%) 912.2Mi (0.0%) PIM 375.7K (0.0%) 376.4K (0.0%) 34.5Mi (0.0%)
IPv6-NoNxt 3.2M (0.1%) 4.9M (0.0%) 186.1Mi (0.0%) HOPOPT 154.1K (0.0%) 171.6K (0.0%) 17.0Mi (0.0%)
PIM 309.6K (0.0%) 1.5M (0.0%) 198.5Mi (0.0%) IPv6 101.0K (0.0%) 20.0M (0.0%) 3.1Gi (0.0%)
IPv4 16.6K (0.0%) 270.1M (0.3%) 110.8Gi (0.1%) ESP 68.6K (0.0%) 164.2M (0.1%) 144.2Gi (0.1%)
OSPFIGP 4.3K (0.0%) 116.4K (0.0%) 8.4Mi (0.0%) IPv6-Opts 8.9K (0.0%) 8.9K (0.0%) 976.0Ki (0.0%)
ESP 2.1K (0.0%) 265.6K (0.0%) 65.0Mi (0.0%) Reserved 20 (0.0%) 20 (0.0%) 2.4Ki (0.0%)
Other 713 (0.0%) 793 (0.0%) 245.2Ki (0.0%) Other 6 (0.0%) 6 (0.0%) 472 (0.0%)
TABLE V: Longer EH chains detailed
EHs Upper proto Flows Packets Bytes
CESNET:
HOPOPT, IPv6-Frag IPv6-ICMP 501 25.7K 16.6Mi
IPv6-Frag, ESP ESP 144 46.4K 31.7Mi
IPv6-Frag, IPv6-Frag TCP 3 21 1.6Ki
254, HIP XTP 1 1 1.4Ki
IPv6-Route, AH 151 1 1 1.4Ki
HOPOPT, AH ARIS 1 1 996
AH, Shim6 192 1 1 299
AH, ESP ESP 1 1 176
253, IPv6-Route PUP 1 1 158
UTNET:
IPv6-Frag, ESP ESP 58 5.4K 3.7Mi
(proto 0) followed by a Fragmentation Header (proto 44). The
other combinations of headers are only observed once. Note
that protocol numbers 253 and 254, used for experimentation
and testing, are marked as an IPv6 Extension Header in [3], but
these protocol numbers can be used without adhering to actual
extension header wire formats. Interpreting these headers as if
they are extension headers might lead to bogus information,
which might have happened for the two flows listed in the
table.
C. Actual, hidden upper layer protocols
Aggregating the first EH and the actual upper layer protocol,
we find UDP preceded by Fragmentation Headers to form the
lionshare of the traffic on both networks, albeit only in terms
of flows. For CESNET, as detailed in Table VI, we find the
fragmented UDP to cover 58.0% of flows, but over 99% of
transfered bytes. On UTNET (Table VI) on the other hand,
87.3% of flows is accounted for by fragmented UDP, while it is
less than 3% of transfered bytes. IPSEC ESP is responsible for
97.1% of bytes on UTNET, but negligible for all flow, packet
and byte counts on CESNET. Due to its encrypted nature,
ESP does not allow for further analysis within scope of this
research.
A significant share of the flows on CESNET is comprised
of ICMP6 preceded by Hop-by-Hop Options. At 40.9% that is
a fivefold of what is observed at UTNET. This shows different
(types of) networks can vastly differ in terms of EHs being
transfered, just like they differ with ‘normal’ traffic. As ICMP6
has a different–often more important–role in IPv6 compared to
IPv4, simply dropping all traffic containing EHs would result
in loss of possibly essential ICMP information. In § IV-F, we
analyze the actual types and codes of this hidden ICMP traffic
in more detail.
D. Breakdown of hidden TCP and UDP traffic
Extension headers hide, among other, TCP and UDP traf-
fic that is directly related to end-user QoE. Our exporters
extracted information from the actual upper layer protocols,
e.g. source and destination ports for UDP and TCP, which
are otherwise not available for analysis. In this section we
present the distributions of those ports in terms of flow, packet
and byte counts, in order to draw conclusions regarding the
actual nature of the hidden traffic. These distributions are
visualized in Fig. 2a and 2c for CESNET, and Fig. 2b and
2d for UTNET. Note that for TCP and UDP, the observed EH
is with negligible exception always the Fragmentation Header.
Thus, the following analysis is mainly addressing fragmented
traffic, which likely explains some of the found phenomena.
1) TCP traffic: Analysis of the TCP source port distribution
(Fig. 2a and 2b) observed in the traffic shows 90% of traffic





















































































(e) Fragment sizes CESNET
















(f) Fragment sizes UTNET
Fig. 2: Transport layer port distribution of hidden traffic, and fragmentation characteristics.
CESNET plots on the left, UTNET plots on the right.
NB: Horizontal axes are non-linear. In the port plots, dashed lines represent destination ports; solid lines for source ports.
TABLE VI: CESNET/UTNET: Extension Headers and the actual upper layer
CESNET UTNET
EHs upper Flows Packets Bytes EHs upper Flows Packets Bytes
44; UDP 9.9M (58.0%) 186.4M (94.3%) 213.1Gi (99.3%) 44; UDP 1.7M (87.3%) 4.7M (2.8%) 4.3Gi (2.9%)
0; ICMP6 7.0M (40.9%) 10.4M (5.2%) 895.6Mi (0.4%) 0; ICMP6 154.1K (7.7%) 171.6K (0.1%) 17.0Mi (0.0%)
44; ICMP6 117.0K (0.7%) 273.5K (0.1%) 198.5Mi (0.1%) 50; ESP 68.6K (3.4%) 164.2M (97.1%) 144.2Gi (97.1%)
44; TCP 72.3K (0.4%) 399.5K (0.2%) 378.5Mi (0.2%) 44; ICMP6 20.0K (1.0%) 42.9K (0.0%) 29.0Mi (0.0%)
50; ESP 2.1K (0.0%) 265.6K (0.1%) 65.0Mi (0.0%) 60; IPv6 8.9K (0.4%) 8.9K (0.0%) 976.0Ki (0.0%)
0;44; ICMP6 501 (0.0%) 25.7K (0.0%) 16.6Mi (0.0%) 44; TCP 1.8K (0.1%) 16.2K (0.0%) 16.4Mi (0.0%)
44;50; ESP 144 (0.0%) 46.4K (0.0%) 31.7Mi (0.0%) 44;50; ESP 58.0 (0.0%) 5.4K (0.0%) 3.7Mi (0.0%)
254; 176.0 4 (0.0%) 8 (0.0%) 1.5Ki (0.0%) 253; 217.0 1 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%) 72 (0.0%)
44;44; TCP 3 (0.0%) 21 (0.0%) 1.6Ki (0.0%) 253; 218.0 1 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%) 72 (0.0%)
Other Other 219 (0.0%) 219 (0.0%) 120.1Ki (0.0%) Other Other 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
This is the case for both CESNET and UTNET, and can be
explained by the nature of small requests resulting in large
responses (thus fragmentation) that is often seen in networked
services.
The plots feature a non-linear x-axis to include more detail
on the first 1024 ports. In both networks, the first (and largest)
share of traffic is attributed to source port 53, likely large DNS
responses containing DNSSEC signatures [13]. Furthermore,
both networks show HTTP(S) traffic from ports 80 and 443
(as annotated in the plots). On CESNET another source port
is noticeable, namely 83332, which is likely related to BitCoin
network traffic. The remaining shares of traffic is divided over
higher ports (most evident in Fig. 2b) where the ephemeral port
ranges3 are notable, hinting at client side initiated connections.
Looking at the distribution of TCP destination ports, we
learn that 10% of traffic (in terms of flows) is directed at
ports below 1024 in UTNET (Fig. 2b), mostly at port 80.
In CESNET however, there is no sign of significant amounts
of server-oriented traffic: the distribution in CESNET shows
again the ephemeral port ranges, without any major jumps. In
UTNET we observed noticeable jumps in the lower 50000-
range, between port 50000 up to 52623. This might indicate
use of specific (types of) software, e.g. certain BitTorrent
clients.
Comparing the distributions of source and destination ports
for TCP, we conclude that responses from servers are of-
ten fragmented, while the initial connection was not. With
aggressive EH filtering on network edges, this means that
e.g. webservers or nameservers do receive and handle incom-
ing requests, while their outgoing responses might never leave
the network.
2) UDP traffic: For UDP traffic originating from ports
below 1024, the difference between the distribution of flows,
and the distribution of packet count and byte count is more
significant than for TCP, in both networks (Fig. 2c, 2d). In
both networks, most flows originate from source port 53 (DNS,
again likely with DNSSEC signatures). Small jumps are visible
in both networks, port 20243 in CESNET being the most
significant but only in terms of packets and bytes. This means
a small number of large flows is responsible for this jump.
2https://bitcoin.org/en/full-node#network-configuration
3Ephemeral port ranges: IANA: 49152 – 65535 (used by recent version of
MS Windows and FreeBSD); Linux: 32768 – 61000
The destination plots show an ostensible jump at port 443,
most significant on CESNET (20% of flows). UDP traffic on
port 443 is most likely QUIC, though one would expect this
to be traffic originating from 443 (e.g. YouTube streaming)
rather than destination port 443. Other possible explanations
are uploading large files over QUIC (again, YouTube videos),
because there is a jump for bytes and packets as well. Besides
QUIC, other protocols could be explicitly configured to use
UDP/443, e.g. OpenVPN. On UTNET, we find a jump (for
packets and bytes) at destination port 51413, which is used
by the popular BitTorrent client Transmission. Similar to
CESNET, we see a jump at port 443.
E. Fragmentation characteristics
Looking into how the previously described traffic is frag-
mented, we find that at least 90% of the traffic is rightfully
fragmented, i.e. has a total size of at least 1500 bytes after
reassembly. In Fig. 2e and 2f, the distribution of sizes of first
fragments and non-first fragments are plotted. Clearly, most
first fragments are 1280 bytes in size, hinting at either a default
value in fragmentation procedures in network stacks, or net-
work administrators that prefer safely configured forwarding
devices and chose the minimum IPv6 payload size for their
MTUs.
The non-first fragments are plotted with the mean packet
size within their flow, and the total size (of all non-first
fragments combined, within their flow). These distributions
only differ in the upper 20% and 10% for CESNET and UT-
NET, respectively, meaning that 80% and 90% of fragmented
packets consist of only two fragments: one first fragment, and
one non-first fragment. Combining all the fragments results in
the Total size plot, which shows us the aforementioned 90%
of reassembled packets to be larger than 1500 bytes in size.
F. Breakdown of hidden ICMP6 traffic
Mostly behind Hop-by-Hop Options, ICMP6 is the second-
most observed hidden upper layer protocol in both networks.
In CESNET, the share of ICMP6 flows behind HBH-options is
40.9% (Table VI). Additionally, 501 flows with HBH-options
also included a Fragmentation Header, followed by the actual
ICMP6 payload. In UTNET, the lower 7.7% still forms a
significant part of the hidden traffic in terms of flows, however
it only accounts for 0.1% of packets.
TABLE VII: CESNET: hidden ICMP6 types and codes
EHs Type Code Description Packets
CESNET:
0; 131 0 Multicast Listener Report 8.0M
0; 143 0 Version 2 Multicast Listener Report 2.1M
44; 129 0 Echo Reply 154.7K
0; 130 0 Multicast Listener Query 125.0K
0; 135 0 Neighbor Solicitation 108.8K
0; 4 1 Parameter Problem 24.4K
0;44; 3 1 Time Exceeded 12.9K
0; 1 4 Destination Unreachable 4.8K
44; 128 0 Echo Request 3.8K
44; 3 0 Time Exceeded 33.0
0; 132 0 Multicast Listener Done 29.0
44; 1 0 Destination Unreachable 4.0
0; 128 0 Echo Request 1.0
43; 161 13 161 1.0
UTNET:
0; 130 0 Multicast Listener Query 86.1K
0; 143 0 Version 2 Multicast Listener Report 85.6K
44; 129 0 Echo Reply 21.5K
44; 128 0 Echo Request 928.0
44; 3 0 Time Exceeded 36.0
We analyzed the ICMP types and codes per the (one or
multiple) EHs. The overviews of these numbers are given in
Table VII. Due to the nature of ICMP, i.e. facilitating control
rather than transport, we only show packet counts in the tables.
In both networks, most ICMP packets are multicast-related,
all preceded by HBH-options. Fragmented ICMP consists of
Echo Replies (pongs) mostly, and in UTNET accounts for
11.1% of all ICMP with EHs.
G. Analysis of EH misuse
As described in § II, there is a plethora of known, possible
misuses based on EHs. While it is not in all cases possible to
classify traffic as benign or malicious based on the collected
flow data, we did observe several cases that are at least
suspicious.
1) Abnormally large Extension Headers: On CESNET, we
measured 179 flows to contain EHs with a size larger than 256
bytes: of these, 86 were larger than 1280 bytes, and 74 even
exceeded 1460 bytes. Adding the 40 bytes of the IPv6 header
itself, those packets would fill 1500 bytes without counting
upper layer payload (if any). Comparing the size of the packets
to the number of bytes specified in the Length field of the EHs,
158 of these flows show a difference of more than 56 bytes
(i.e. the IPv6 header size of 40 bytes, plus two times 8 bytes
for two EHs): the largest difference is over 2000 bytes.
Naturally, extracting upper layer payload information from
these packets is not feasible: the (too) large EH Lengths
point to an upper layer offset that is outside of the actual
packet, hence one can not use it to find actual upper layers.
Whether these packets were malformed in transit or purposely
constructed by the source, can not be concluded from this
data. Like our measurement appliance, forwarding devices
and (security-related) middleboxes that parse the EHs will
encounter the same problem, and need to make a decision
on whether to forward or to drop the traffic.
2) Double fragmentation headers: As shown in Table V,
we observed three flows in CESNET that contained multiple
Fragmentation Headers. All of the 21 packets in these flows
originated from the same IPv6 address, from TCP source port
80 — likely HTTP traffic. All packets were sent to a single
IPv6 destination address, though to three different ports (and
therefore split into three different flow records). The mean
packet size in these flows was 76 bytes. This small size does
not justify fragmentation, and containing two fragmentation
headers hints at either an evasion attempt, or a network stack
in an erroneous state.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Dropping all packets that contain Extension Headers is
a bad practice. Our measurements show that a significant
share of the IPv6 traffic contains one EH, carrying payloads
crucial for both operators (in the case of ICMP6) or end-users
(e.g. fragmented DNS responses). Discarding this traffic leads
to unpleasant surprises that are not trivial to troubleshoot.
The share of traffic containing more than one EH however,
is very small. For the design of hardware able to handle the
dynamic nature of EHs, we therefore recommend to support
at least one EH: the exceptional packets containing more EHs
can be handled in the slow-path, i.e. a slower CPU in the
network device, without substantial performance loss, while
still offering flexibility to drop packets with e.g. more than
three EHs to prevent the possible Denial of Service attack.
Choosing to simply drop packets with more than one EH still
impairs end-user experiences, e.g. in the case of fragmented
IPSEC ESP, and is therefore not recommended.
Threats based on Extension Headers become visible when
adapting your flow monitoring to traverse and account for the
EH-chain. While no extraordinarily long chains were observed,
we did measure suspiciously sized EHs. The presented en-
hancements in flow measurements enable security officers to
filter out suspicious traffic easily, and conduct further analysis.
Measuring hidden traffic, e.g. TCP or UDP preceded by
EHs, does not only reveal which (end-user) services are used,
as aforementioned: it also aids in spotting possible middle-
box evasion. Querying flow-data for suspicious traffic towards
critical services is easy, since one can filter on the EH count
and service ports, e.g. TCP destination port 22 for SSH.
Finally, the two measured networks should not be consid-
ered representative for the entire Internet: the different results
emphasize the need for adequately adapted flow measurement
tools. Different types of networks carry a different collection
and distribution of Extension Headers, or have their own
specific configuration that might result in traffic considered
suspicious in other networks. Deploying adapted measurement
and monitoring solutions is a necessary first step to inventory
what actually is hidden behind the Extension Headers.
Future work: Some of our findings raised questions that we
hope to answer in future research. Particularly, we are inter-
ested in the cause(s) of the observed fragmented TCP traffic.
Furthermore, enhancing the measurement setup with the option
to fully capture packets of suspicious flows (e.g. abnormally
large Extension Headers) should help us understand the true
nature of these packets. Both these works should provide in-
sights for operators, helping them to identify (and distinguish)
both misconfigurations and misuse in their networks.
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